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Abstract
Intrusion detection systems (IDSs) have become a core component of a firm’s IT security architecture. While
IDSs enable real time detection of intrusions, a common criticism has been the frequency of false alarms, which
undermines their effectiveness.  A fundamental problem with IDSs for intrusion detection is achieving the
optimal balance between detection rate and false positive and false negative rates. Many firms use decision
theoretic approaches to deal with the IDS configuration problem. While decision theoretic approaches are
appropriate for configuring many types of machine learning and classification software that suffer from false
positive and false negative errors, we argue that decision theoretic approaches have fundamental limitations
for configuring IDSs. Decision theoretic approaches are based on the presumption that configuration does not
influence the behavior of hackers. Game theoretic approaches recognize the fact that hackers do modify their
strategies in response to firms’ actions. In this paper, we compare the decision and game theoretic approaches
to the IDS configuration problem when firms are faced with strategic hackers. We find that under most
circumstances firms incur lower costs when they use game theory as opposed to decision theory because
decision theory approach frequently either over- or under-configures the IDS. However, firms incur the same
or lower cost under decision theory approach compared to the game theory approach if configurations under
decision theory and game theory are sufficiently close.  A limitation of the game theory approach is that it
requires user specific utility parameters, which are difficult to estimate. Decision theory, in contrast to game
theory, requires the attack probability estimate, which is more easily obtained.
Introduction
Intrusion detection systems (IDSs) have become a core component of a firm’s IT security architecture. IDSs embed pattern
recognition intelligence to classify an event as normal or intrusive. Although IDSs enable real time detection of intrusions, some
security experts criticize that false alarms undermine their effectiveness (Axelsson 2000). A fundamental problem with IDSs for
intrusion detection is achieving the optimal balance between detection rate and false positive and false negative rates. False
positives occur when the system classifies a normal event as an intrusion. False negatives occur when the system classifies an
intrusion as a normal event. While it is desirable to have low false positive and low false negative rates, a reduction in one type
of error is often accompanied by an increase in the other type. The goal of configuration of is to balance the two error rates in
order to minimize the firm’s cost. In this paper, we investigate the problem of optimal configuration of intrusion detection systems
using decision and game theoretic approaches. 
Decision theory is often used to analyze the risk associated with configuration problem. Recently Gaffney and Ulvila (2001)
proposed a decision theory based approach to configure IDSs. Calibration of algorithms used in many classification programs
is also based on decision theoretic approaches, which simply compare the costs associated with false positive and false negative
errors. While the decision theory based approach can provide a useful starting point for managing risk in settings where potential
for intrusion exists, we argue that this method is incomplete because of the problem’s strategic nature. The reason for the
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1Fellingham and Newman (1985) make the same observation in the auditing context.
2www.cnn.com/2002/US/03/25/airport.security/?related.
3Configuration management tools are much broader in scope than the configuration task we consider in this paper. They support related tasks
such as version control support and configuration process management support.
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limitation of the decision theory approach can be stated as one simple proposition: it does not allow a firm’s decisions to influence
the behavior of hackers. Researchers and practitioners have long recognized the behavioral influences of a firm’s actions on
hackers (Cavusoglu et al. 2002).  For example, it has been pointed out that security should be viewed as a cat-and-mouse game
played by firms and hackers (Jajodia and Miller 1993). Hackers do not randomly select their targets. They rationally make their
choices based on how much effort will be required to succeed in hacking, the probability of getting caught, and penalty. Such
strategic interactions between a firm’s decisions and hackers have to be captured in the model used to determine the IDS
configuration. Because decision theory is designed to analyze decision making under uncertainty where nature is the only
opponent, it is fundamentally inadequate to address the intrusion detection problem where firms deal with strategic adversaries.1
Modeling the interaction between firm and user decisions requires game theory. 
Traditional decision theory assumes that the firm exogenously estimates the probability of intrusion in choosing the configuration.
Although the firm can perform sensitivity analysis with respect to the estimated attack probability, the model still provides only
partial solutions. In the game theoretical model, both the firm’s configuration and the attack probability are endogenously
determined. In this paper, we derive the optimal configuration under decision theory and game theory and compare the resulting
costs. We find that game theory results in a lower cost except when the configuration under decision theory is sufficiently close
to the configuration under game theory. The results of our model caution firms that ignoring the reactions of their strategic
adversaries can cause significant harm to firms.
Related Work
The paper that comes closest to ours is Gaffney and Ulvila (2001). They analyze the IDS configuration problem from a decision
theory perspective and determine the best operating point of the IDS for a given environment. Their study integrates the costs of
dealing with false positive and false negative errors and the quality profile of the IDS as indicated by its receiving operating
characteristics (ROC) curve, which relates rates of these two errors. Although Gaffney and Ulvila consider hostility of operating
environment as one of the factors that determine the configuration, they assume a fixed attack level. Our study assumes that the
realized attack level is determined by operating environment (firm and hacker specific factors) and configuration and is not
necessarily the same as estimated attack level.   In contrast to Gaffney and Ulvila, one of the goals of this paper is to develop a
framework that explicitly models the strategic aspect related to user behavior in response to the IDS configuration and the firm’s
strategy in a cost-minimizing framework. Another goal is to compare the decision theoretic approach with the game theory
approach for the IDS configuration.
The broader area of this paper relates to configuration management and performance evaluation of software. Guidelines from
commercial classification software manufacturers as well as research institutes emphasize the need for proper configuration of
detection systems. For example, CERT’s guidelines (CERT 2001) on installing security software cautions firms against accepting
the default settings automatically and advises appropriate configuration to balance security and operational requirements. Similar
observations have been made for other detection software such as explosives detection systems used by airports (NMAB 1998).
According to a federal report, between November 2001 and February 2002, security screeners missed 70 percent of knives, 60
percent of simulated explosive devices, and 30 percent of guns. Commenting about this, the former FAA security chief Billie
Vincent noted, “The current metal detectors won't do the job. If you turn it high enough to detect that much metal, you will have
an alarm on every person going through.”2  This effectively implies hand screening of all bags and passengers, which will balloon
the cost of security at the airports.
In order to support and manage software configuration, a whole industry that develops configuration management tools has
evolved.3  The overriding goal of these efforts has been the performance of the software as measured by its classification accuracy.
Evaluation of software such as intrusion detection systems, machine learning systems, and other classification programs has relied
on false positive and false negative rates (Durst et al. 1999; McHugh 2000; Sarkar and Sriram 2001). Modeling the accuracy of
classification software is a well-established area with many known models and measures such as lift, response ratio, L-Quality,
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and others (Shapiro and Masand 1999, Shapiro and Steingold 2000, Steingold et al. 2001). All these models use Bayesian decision
theory. Our model also relies on Bayesian decision theory to generate the quality profile of the IDS. However, unlike previous
models, our model for configuration does not use classification accuracy exclusively. Firms are interested in not only raw
performance measures but also the overall cost of the detection process. Recently, researchers have recognized the importance
of costs of misclassification in measuring IDS performance. Lee et al. (2002) developed a detection model that incorporates these
costs in the classification algorithm itself in order to minimize costs. Our model for the IDS configuration also minimizes a firm’s
cost. The innovation in our analysis, absent in prior work, is the explicit modeling of the strategic aspect related to user behavior
in response to IDS quality and a firm’s response in a cost minimizing framework.
The need for incorporating user behavior in software configuration has been recognized in the IT security context in order to
develop better security breach prevention and detection software. Johsson and Olovsson (1997) pointed out that the common
criteria used to evaluate security software “reflect static design properties and do not incorporate the interaction with the
environment in a probabilistic way.”  Using an experiment, they modeled attacker behavior and concluded that the attacking
process can be split into learning, standard attack, and innovative attack phases. In a related work, Ortalo et al. (1999) proposed
measures using a Markovian model that estimates the effort an attacker might expend to exploit system vulnerabilities. While
these models capture the dynamic aspects of user behavior, we use a static model that captures attacker behavior through the attack
probability. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows.  The next section summarizes the statistical decision theory that underlies IDSs.
We then introduce our model framework to address the IDS configuration problem.  The optimal configurations under decision
theory and game theory approaches are derived.  The results under these two approaches are compared.  Finally, we present our
conclusions.
IDSs and ROC Curves
The principles underlying IDSs are grounded in classical decision theory. The basic components of a decision theory problem,
as applied to the intrusion detection scenario, are shown in Figure 1. The first is a source that generates the inputs to the IDS. The
source is the users interacting with the system that the IDS is designed to protect. In the simplest case, there are two types of users:
normal (H0) and hacker (H1). The normal user generates legal or authorized transactions. The hacker generates illegal transactions
or intrusions. The probabilistic transition mechanism controls the relative frequencies of legal transactions and intrusions. In a
typical real life detection scenario, a large percentage of transactions are legal. The skewed nature of the frequency distribution
makes detection of illegal transactions difficult. The IDS observes the transaction but does not know whether it is a legal
transaction or an intrusion. The goal of the IDS is to classify each transaction as legal or illegal. Two types of errors can occur
in this classification: classification of an illegal transaction as a legal transaction (false negative) and classification of a legal
transaction as an illegal transaction (false positive).
We define
Probability of detection = PD = Pr(classify into H1|H1 is true), or
Probability of false negatve = 1-PD
Probability of false positive = PF = Pr(classify into H1|H0 is true)
In general, we would like to have PD as large as possible and PF as small as possible in an IDS. However, it is not always possible
to increase PD and decrease PF simultaneously. This is because of variability associated with the data of legal and illegal
transactions and imprecision of algorithms and models used by IDSs. Many IDSs classify transactions based on whether a
numerical score computed from transaction data exceeds a threshold value and/or whether the transaction data satisfy a rule. The
quality parameters PD and PF of an IDS can be configured, although not independently, by setting its threshold value or relaxing
or tightening the rules. Consequently, the quality profile of an IDS is characterized by a curve that relates its PD and PF, known
as the receiver operating characteristics (ROC) curve (Van Trees 2001). 
The ROC curve of an IDS can be derived experimentally or analytically (Durst et al. 1999, Lippman et al. 2000, McHugh 2000).
The analytical procedure proceeds as follows. Consider an IDS that uses a numerical score x computed from transaction data and
a threshold value t to detect intrusions. Let the IDS classify a transaction as illegal if x > t for that transaction; otherwise as legal.
It follows that
Cavusoglu & Raghunathan/Intrusion Detection Systems
4We performed the analysis for the case when the numerical scores are normally distributed. Although closed form analytical expressions are
unavailable, numerical solutions give qualitatively same insights. 
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Figure 1.  Components of a Detection Problem
where and  are the probability density functions of x for legal and illegal transactions respectively.  Figure 2( )Nf x ( )Ff x
illustrates these probability calculations.
Figure 2.   Computation of PD and PF
The shape of the ROC curve depends on the probability density functions of xN and xF. We assume that the numerical score used
to distinguish normal from illegal transactions follows an exponential distribution. Exponential distributions, besides being
analytically tractable, capture the skewed nature of transaction data very well.4  Let the numerical scores for the normal and illegal
transactions follow exponential distributions with parameters and , , respectively.  Then we can write PD andNλ Fλ N Fλ λ>
PF as  
(1)( ) FxFD F
t
tP e dx eλ λλ
∞
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−
= =∫
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Thus PD  can be expressed as a function of PF  as
(3)rD FP P=
where   is between 0 and 1. Lower values of result r in steeper ROC curves.
Figure 3 shows sample ROC curves for various values of r.
Since IDSs are imperfect, they are only used as decision support tools in many commercial organizations. A security expert further
investigates transactions classified as illegal by the IDS. Similarly, the expert may also randomly investigate transactions classified
as legal by the IDS. The frequency of such random investigations depends on various costs including the cost of performing the
investigation and the cost of misclassification. 
Figure 3.  ROC Curves
The Model Framework for Configuration the IDS
We consider a firm that uses an IDS to detect intrusions. Our model of IDS is similar to that described in the previous section.
A user can generate legal or illegal transactions. Users may intrude depending on factors such as the benefit they derive from
break-in, the penalty they will receive if they are caught, and the likelihood that they will be caught. We assume that a user
committing the intrusion derives a benefit of :. If the intrusion is detected, the user incurs a penalty of $. The penalty can take
different forms depending on the nature of intrusion.  It can be the cost from legal prosecution or social humiliation. We denote
the probability that a user commits an intrusion by R.
The IDS analyzes each of the transactions. If the program deems a transaction to be illegal, it generates a signal. The firm then
decides whether to investigate or not investigate the transaction. The firm makes a decision about whether to investigate or not
based on the state (the signal or the no signal) it is in. However, when the program generates a signal, the firm does not know with
certainty whether there has been a true attack or whether the program generated a false alarm. Similar uncertainty exists also when
the program does not generate a signal.
The firm supplements the IDS with manual investigation by a human expert. The human expert may investigate only a proportion
(D1) of transactions that generated signals. Furthermore, the expert may investigate a proportion (D2) of transactions that did not
generate signals. The firm incurs a cost of c each time the human expert performs a manual investigation. We assume that manual
Cavusoglu & Raghunathan/Intrusion Detection Systems
5We can extend the model easily to the case when manual investigation is not 100 percent effective. The results will not change
qualitatively.
6Again, our model can easily be extended to the case in which the firm recovers only a portion of the damage that has already been inflicted.
The qualitative nature of results under this more general model is identical to that presented in this paper.
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investigation always detects intrusions.5  If the firm detects the intrusion, the firm does not incur any loss,6 other than the cost of
manual investigation. When an intrusion is undetected, the firm incurs a damage of d. Most companies estimate these possible
damages in the risk assessment phase prior to implementing and configuring the IDS.  The quality profile of the detector is
modeled through its ROC curve. 
Optimal Configurations under Decision Theory and Game Theory Approaches
Our analysis for deriving the optimal configuration proceeds using backward induction follows.  First, for a given configuration,
i.e., PD and PF, we determine the optimal D1 and D2 as a function of PD and PF. Then, we determine the optimal PD and PF by
minimizing the firm’s expected cost subject to the ROC curve constraint. The firm can use decision theoretic or game theoretic
approach in determining the optimal decisions. We derive the optimal configuration for the decision theory approach first followed
by the game theory approach.
Decision Theory Approach
A decision theoretic approach determines optimal configuration by minimizing its cost for a given risk environment. Firms assess
the risk before applying the decision theoretic model. This method does not consider the behavioral implications of the
configuration on users. The decision theoretic model for a given configuration is shown in Figure 4. 
Figure 4.  The Decision Theoretic Model for Configuring an IDS
Cavusoglu & Raghunathan/Intrusion Detection Systems
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When the firm observes a signal or no signal from the IDS for a transaction, it updates its belief about the transaction type using
Bayes’ rule. If the firm gets a signal, it determines the posterior probability of intrusion as
(4)
1
P(signal|intrusion)P(intrusion)=P(intrusion|signal) =
P(signal|intrusion)P(intrusion)+P(signal|no-intrusion)P(no-intrusion)
  
(1 )
D
D F
P
P P
η
ψ
ψ ψ
=
+ −
Similarly, when the firm does not get any signal, it calculates the posterior probability as
(5)
2
P(no-signal|intrusion)P(intrusion)P(intrusion|no-signal)
P(no-signal|intrusion)P(intrusion) P(no-signal|no-intrusion)P(no-intrusion)
(1 )
(1 ) (1 )(1 )
D
D F
P
P P
η
ψ
ψ ψ
= =
+
−
=
− + − −
The probability of the firm being in the signal state can be computed to be x= . ( ( ))F D FP P Pψ+ −
The expected cost for each action in each of the decision nodes is computed to be the following:
Cost  (investigate | signal) = 01c + (1 – 01)c = c
Cost  (investigate | signal) = 01(d) + (1 – 01)0 = d01
Cost  (investigate | no signal) = 02c + (1 – 02)c = c
Cost  (investigate | no signal) = 02(d) + (1 – 02)0 = d02
The firm will decide to investigate or not investigate in a state (signal and the no signal) by choosing the action that yields the
lower expected cost. The following result shows the firm’s optimal strategies in the signal and no signal states.
Result 1.  The optimal manual investigation frequencies for a given IDS  configuration in the decision theory framework are as
follows.
â Ï Ð2
c
d
η< 2 1
c
d
η η< < 1
c
d
η>
D1 = 1, D2 = 1 D1 = 1, D2 = 0 D1 = 0, D2 = 0
The above result is consistent with our intuition. Choosing to investigate every transaction irrespective of whether the program
generates a signal or not is the best strategy for the firm if the ratio (cost/benefit) of investigation is sufficiently low. On the
contrary, it is optimal for the firm not to investigate any transaction if the ratio is sufficiently high. If the ratio is moderate, the
firm should investigate all and only those transactions that generated signals. Substitution of the above optimal investigation
strategies in the firm’s expected cost expressions gives the firm’s expected cost for different parameter regions, as given in
Table 1.
Table 1.  Firm’s Expected Costs under Decision Theory Approach
Region Firm’s Expected Cost
1 c
2 dR + (c – d)RPD + c(1 – R)PF
3 dR
Cavusoglu & Raghunathan/Intrusion Detection Systems
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An inspection of the expected cost expressions reveals that configuration is relevant only in region 2 because the expected costs
in other regions are independent of PD and PF. 
Result 2:  IDS is valuable and configuration is important only if (cost/benefit) ratio of manual investigation, ( ), is greater than
01 and less than 02 .
Since configuration is relevant only in region 2, firms only in that region will use the IDS to supplement their manual
investigations. We focus only on this region to determine the optimal configuration. That is, we assume that the firm’s cost
parameters are such that it operates in region 2. Writing PF  as a function of PD (using equation. 3), we get the firm’s expected
cost in region 2 as  .  Minimizing this over PD gives
(6)
(7)
Substituting these optimal configuration points into the expected cost expression gives the expected cost of
.
The decision theory approach uses an estimate of the probability of attack while solving the configuration problem. However,
in reality the probability that a user commits an intrusion need not necessarily be the same as that estimated by the firm. The
realized probability of attack depends critically on how the user determines his/her strategy. 
Game Theory Approach
The game theory approach differs from the decision theory approach in one important respect. In the game theory approach, the
firm makes its decisions by anticipating the behavior of the user in response to its actions. Thus, while the decision theory
approach assumes that the probability of intrusion y is unaffected by PD, PF, D1 , and D2, the game theory approach utilizes the fact
that the user will change his/her strategy based on the firm’s decisions. We consider the case when the user and the firm make
their decisions simultaneously. We identify a Nash equilibrium. In a Nash equilibrium, neither player has an incentive to deviate
from the equilibrium as long as the other player does not deviate.
In order to analyze the strategic interactions between the firm employing the IDS and the user, we enhance the decision theory
model to include the user’s and firm’s strategies. The game theoretical model for the firm is shown in Figure 5. 
Node 1 represents a user interacting with the IDS. Node 2 represents a normal transaction whereas node 3 represents an illegal
transaction. Nodes 6 and 7 represent transactions that generated a signal from the IDS. Node 7 represents a true attack (true
positive) whereas node 6 represents a false alarm (false positive). Nodes 4 and 5 represent transactions that did not generate a
signal from the IDS. Node 5 denotes a missed attack (false negative) whereas node 4 implies that the IDS did not give any false
alarm (true negative). The firm does not know whether the transaction is in node 6 or node 7 when there is a signal. Similarly,
when the program does not generate a signal for a transaction, the firm does not know whether the transaction is in node 4 or
node 5. The dashed curves in Figure 5 enclose the information sets of the firm. There are two information sets. The one in which
there is a signal, and the one in which there is no signal from the program. The firm must make decisions about whether to conduct
a manual investigation of a transaction without knowing exactly which node it is in within the information set.
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Figure 5.  The Game Theoretic Model for Configuring an IDS
The strategy set of a user is {no-intrusion, intrusion}. The strategy set of the firm is {investigate|no-signal, do-not-hS ∈ fS ∈
investigate|no-signal, investigate|signal, do-not-investigate|signal} where investigate|no-signal means that the firm chooses to
investigate the transaction even though the IDS does not generate a signal.
The expected cost for the firm depends on the state it is in. The firm’s expected cost for the signal and the no signal states
respectively are as follows.
(8)1 1 1 1( , ) (1 )SF c dρ ψ ρ η ρ= + −
(9)2 2 2 2( , ) (1 )NF c dρ ψ ρ η ρ= + −
The firm’s overall expected cost for a transaction is given by
(10)1 2 1 2( , , ) ( ( )) ( , ) (1 ( )) ( , )F D F S F D F NF P P P F P P P Fρ ρ ψ ψ ρ ψ ψ ρ ψ= + − + − − −
The user’s expected benefit is
(11)1 2 1 2( , , ) ( (1 ))D DH P Pρ ρ ψ ψµ ψβ ρ ρ= − + −
The firm minimizes  when it gets a signal from the IDS and when it does not get a signal from the IDS.1( , )SF ρ ψ 2( , )NF ρ ψ
The user maximizes .  The following result holds in our model (All proofs are available from the authors).1 2( , , )H ρ ρ ψ
Result 3:  The probability of manual investigation when there is a signal is greater than or equal to the manual investigation
probability when there is no signal (i.e., D1 $ D2).  In addition, both probabilities cannot be positive and less than one at the same
time.  
Cavusoglu & Raghunathan/Intrusion Detection Systems
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Result 3 is consistent with the intuition that the firm will investigate a larger fraction of the cases that generated signals from the
IDS compared to those that did not generate signals. Now we can present the optimal frequency of manual investigations. 
Result 4.  The optimal frequencies for manual investigation for a given configuration of the IDS  using game theoretic framework
are as follows.
Region 1c
d
< 1c
d
>
>1
µ
β
1ψ =
Ð
D1 = 1, D2 = 1 
R =1
Ñ
D1 = 0, D2 = 1
(1 )
( ) (1 )
F
D F D
c P
c P P P d
ψ −=
− + −
Ï
, 1 1ρ = 2 (1 )
D
D
P
P
µ βρ β
−
=
−
DP
µ
β <
( )
F
D D F
cP
P d c P P
ψ =
− −
Î
, 1
DP
µρ β= 2 0ρ =
The equilibrium policies given in result 4 are characterized by the ratios  and . We can observe that, in general, the
µ
β
probability of investigation decreases and probability of intrusion increases when  increases for a given  ,  and the probability
µ
β
of intrusion as well as probability of investigation increases with  for a given .  Table 2 shows the firm’s expected cost under
µ
β
the optimal manual investigation policy for the different regions.
Table 2.  Firm’s Expected Costs
Region Firm’s Expected Cost Region Firm’s Expected Cost
1
( )
F
D D F
cP d
P d c P P− −
3 c
2 4
( ( ) (1 ) ( ) )
( ) (1 )
D F F D F
D F D
c c P P P d P P d
c P P P d
− + − − −
− + −
d
The following result is apparent from Table 2. 
Result 5:  IDS is valuable and as a result configuration is important only if benefit to cost ratio of intrusion for the user ( ) and
µ
β
cost to benefit ratio of manual investigation for the firm ( ) are both less than one.
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7Actually, the firm will set PD to , where e is an infinitesimally small number.
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Configuration is important only in region 1 and region 2. Through configuration, the firm can choose which region to lie in by
specifying PD and PF. Subtracting the expected cost in region 1 from that in region 2 gives
.   Hence the firm will choose its configuration so that the equilibrium point lies
in region 1. Next the firm should decide where to lie within region 1. Writing the cost expression in region 1 as a function of PD
gives .
( )
r
D
r
D D
cd P
c P P d c+ -
 (12)
This derivative implies that the firm will choose to set PD as small as possible. Since the firm wants to be in region 1, the firm
sets PD of its detection system to .7 That is, the optimal configuration for the IDS is
µ
β
 (13)
(14)
Substituting the above optimal configuration point into the cost expression gives an expected cost of . 
Comparison of Game Theoretic and Decision Theoretic Approaches
Having derived the optimal configurations under the decision theoretic and game theoretic approaches, we can now compare the
firm’s realized costs under these approaches. We use the following definitions for our comparisons.
 ≡ optimal probability of detection under decision theory approachDDP
≡ optimal probability of false alarm under decision theory approachD
F
P
≡ optimal probability of detection under the game theory approachGDP
≡ optimal probability of false alarm under game theory approachGFP
≡ realized probability of intrusion Rψ
The realized cost at the optimal configuration under the decision theory approach is given by
.  We need to determine the realized probability of intrusion in order to compute the( ) (1 )D DR R RD Fd c d P c Pψ ψ ψ+ − + −
realized cost under the decision theory. Since the user is strategic, he/she will adjust his/her strategy depending on the strategy
Cavusoglu & Raghunathan/Intrusion Detection Systems
8In the simultaneous game, the user will not be able to observe the firm’s decision if the firm also uses game theory. We can interpret the
equilibrium derived in this paper as the steady state that will be reached after several alternating moves by the firm and the user. However, if
the firm is nonstrategic and uses the decision theory approach, the user will adjust his/her strategy in the second period based on what he/she
observes in the first period. Since the firm does not adjust its strategy, the equilibrium will be reached in the second period itself.
2003 — Twenty-Fourth International Conference on Information Systems 703
used by the firm. That is, the user will choose RR based on his/her utility.8  From the user utility function, we find that the user
will intrude, i.e., RR = 1,  if  and will not intrude, i.e., RR = 0 otherwise. Thus, the realized cost under decision theory
approach is computed to be the following.
Under game theory, the realized cost is identical to the expected costs at the equilibrium because neither party deviates from the
equilibrium. Consequently, the realized cost when the firm uses the game theory approach is .  A comparison
of the realized costs under the decision theory and game theory approaches gives the following result.
Result 6:  Configuration using game theory results in lower cost than configuration using decision theory unless 
The above result can be illustrated using Figure 6, which plots the realized costs under two approaches for different values of RD.
It also shows the realized values of intrusion probability in different regions. Game theory approach results in a lower cost to the
firm in all cases except when the firm uses a attack probability that lies in the interval (a,b), where a and b are respectively the
lower and upper limits for RD given in result 6, under decision theory approach. 
Decision theory performs worse than game theory if the firm does not deter the user from committing the intrusion. In other
words, if the firm estimates a low probability of attack and configures the IDS with a low probability of detection, the user ends
up committing an intrusion. In this scenario, the firm incurs a higher cost than under game theory in which the probability of attack
is less than one. If the firm is successful in deterring the user from committing an intrusion under decision theory, then its cost
under decision theory is lower than game theory only when it does not “over deter” the user, i.e., it does not configure the program
with a very high probability of detection. When the firm’s estimate of the attack probability is very high, it will configure the
program to have a high probability of detection, which will deter the user. While the firm is successful in deterring the user, it
also incurs a high cost from the high rate of false signals from the software. Consequently, the firm realizes a lower cost under
game theory even though the game theory solution does not deter the user from committing an intrusion. 
The result that decision theory can perform better than game theory, although only when the condition stated in result 6 is
satisfied, is counter-intuitive. One would expect that the firm will be better off when it makes the decisions by anticipating the
reaction of the user, as in game theory, as compared to when it does not take the user reaction into consideration, as in decision
theory. The counter-intuitive result can be explained as follows. We can show that when   , i.e., when
RD is equal to the lower limit of the condition stated in result 6, the firm uses the same configuration under decision theory as game
theory.  Under this scenario, though the final outcomes in terms of configuration are identical under the decision theory and game
theory methods, the models used to arrive at these outcomes are different in these methods. If the firm is lucky enough to con-
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9Recall that when the firm uses decision theory approach, it makes its decisions once based on its estimate of the attack probability. The
strategic user adjusts his/her strategy based on the firm’s decision. Thus, the firm acts as a leader and the user acts as a follower under decision
theory approach. 
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figure the software correctly under decision theory approach, then the firm will incur the lowest possible cost because essentially
the firm behaves as though it knows the realized attack probability, which leads to a first mover advantage for the firm.9  Neither
party has a first mover advantage in game theory, and thus the firm incurs a higher cost under game than decision theory approach.
This first mover advantage to the firm under decision theory approach exists as long as the firm does not over-configure (i.e., set
a high detection/false positive rate). If the firm over-configures, the first mover advantage is offset by the higher costs associated
with more frequent false alarms. 
Figure 6.  The Game Theoretic Model for Configuring a Detection Program
Our results clearly show that under most circumstances firms realize lower cost when they use game theory as opposed to decision
theory to configure IDSs when firms are faced with a strategic adversary. However, there seems to a dichotomy between our
results and current business practices, which seem to favor decision theory approach. We hypothesize several reasons for the
dichotomy. One reason could be that firms are truly unaware of the potential benefits of applying the game theoretical approach
for the intrusion detection problem. We believe that this paper provides insights to firms on how and why game theory performs
better than decision theory. Another reason could be that firms view decision theory as a simplification of the more complex game
theory approach. The decision theoretic and game theoretic models require estimation of several parameters. In some sense, the
game theoretic model requires deeper user-specific parameters that are more difficult to obtain. For instance, game theory requires
that the firm knows the user utility and penalty parameters, whereas decision theory requires only the final outcome of users’
decisions in terms of attack probabilities. We believe that attack probabilities are easier to obtain compared to utility because firms
can use historical log records to estimate attack probability. We conjecture that the difficulty in estimation of user specific
parameters is one reason why firms may prefer to use decision theory instead of game theory.  
Conclusions
The performance of IDSs is severely limited by their false positive and false negative errors.  Achieving a high detection rate is
typically accompanied by a high false signal rate. Consequently, firms need to configure the IDS carefully to achieve a balance
between these rates. In this paper we presented two models, the first based on decision theory and the second based on game
theory, to assist firms in the configuration of IDSs. In the decision theory approach, the firm estimates the attack probability
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exogenously and assumes that its actions do not alter users’ behavior. In the game theory approach, the firm makes its decisions
by assuming that the firm’s decisions alter user behavior. We found that firms incur lower cost under most situations when they
use game theory as opposed to decision theory. The decision theory approach results in a lower cost only when the firm neither
under-configures nor over-configures the IDS by a significant amount.  The results of our model caution firms that use of the
decision theory approach for the IDS configuration that ignores the reactions of their strategic adversaries can cause significant
harm to firms. Traditionally IDS configuration is viewed as a firm’s internal problem that affects only the firm. While this is true
of systems that deal with operational problems such as transaction processing systems, strategic applications require modeling
the strategic interactions. Consequently, the design and configuration of such systems need to take into account the effect of
configuration on user behavior.
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